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Abstract 
 
 
A large literature examines the interaction of private and public funding of charities, much of it 
testing if public funding crowds out private funding.  In this paper I look for two alternative 
phenomena using a large panel data set gathered from nonprofit organizations' tax returns.  First, 
I look for crowding out in the opposite direction: increased private funding may cause reduced 
public funding.  Second, I test whether one type of funding acts as a signal of charity quality and 
thus crowds in other funding.  I find evidence that government grants crowd in private donations.  
Crowding in is larger for younger charities.  This is consistent with signaling, if donors know 
less about younger charities and the signal value is stronger.  I find no evidence of an effect of 
private donations on government grants. 
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 Public goods are often provided by both governments and individuals.  The interaction of 
these two sources may affect the overall level of funding.  In response to an increase in 
government spending on a public good or charity, individuals may reduce their contributions. 
The same effect can occur in the opposite direction.  If a government sees that private donations 
to a charity have risen, then it may reduce its support of that charity.  Additionally, some funding 
may crowd in other funding if it signals charity quality. 
 The literature on crowding out extends back to Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984), who 
show theoretically that an exogenous increase in government funding to charities decreases 
private donations dollar-for-dollar.  Some empirical studies, including Kingma (1989), find 
support for such crowding out, but typically at a rate less than one-for-one. 1  Some studies find 
crowding in; Khanna and Sandler (2000) find this for charities in the UK, and Payne (2001) finds 
this for academic research institutions.  Crowding in may occur if grants provide a positive signal 
of charity quality.2  A signaling model of contributions to charities is presented in Payne (2001), 
Vesterlund (2003), and Andreoni (2006), where "seed money" from large donors or 
announcements of previous donations increase others' donations by acting as a signal of the 
charity's quality.  Evidence of this effect is found in a field experiment in List and Lucking-
Reiley (2002).3   
 That literature focuses solely on how government spending affects individual giving.4  
This paper also examines the opposite direction of causality: do private contributions to charities 
affect public contributions?  I look for evidence of either crowding out or crowding in in both 
                                                 
1 One explanation for partial crowding out, provided by Andreoni (1989), is that individuals are "impure altruists" in 
that they receive a "warm glow" from their own giving, independent of the level of the public good.  For more 
evidence of crowding out in other environments, Parker and Thurman (2011) find that government provision of open 
space can crowd out purchases from private land trusts, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) find that Medicaid crowds out 
private insurance, Gruber and Hungerman (2007) find that New Deal programs during the Great Depression 
crowded out church spending on social services, Simmons and Emanuele (2004) find that government funding can 
crowd out individuals' donations of both money and time, and Brooks (2003) finds that government grants affect 
both the number of donors and the average donation per donor. 
2 Rose-Ackerman (1986) describes other conditions under which government grants can crowd in private donations.  
For instance, matching grants are likely to spur an increase in donations.  Grants may also come with mandated 
regulatory changes that make the charity more appealing to donors.  If a charity exhibits economies of scale, then 
increased government revenue reduces the marginal cost of providing the service, making private donations more 
effective. 
3 Landry et. al. (2006) also find some evidence that seed money increases others' contributions, but they find a 
stronger effect from being entered in a lottery for a cash prize when donating and from the physical attractiveness of 
the person asking for a contribution.  Lange (2006) develops a model where the lottery prize money is provided by 
donors and thus acts similarly to seed money. 
4 See also Steinberg (1987) for a model of how federal government spending affects private giving and local 
government spending, and Steinberg (1991) for an empirical meta-analysis.   
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directions using panel data from almost 30,000 charities over six years.  Though numerous 
papers test whether government grants crowd out private donations to charities, none can be 
found that test for crowding out in the opposite direction using micro-level data.5  I also examine 
whether crowding in is consistent with quality signaling.  
 I find that government grants crowd in private donations, with a dollar increase in 
government grants leading to an increase in private donations between 10 and 30 cents.  I find 
this result in various specifications of the data sample, although the statistical significance of the 
coefficient is generally just below the 10 percent level.  It is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level in regressions using a subset of charities as the sample.  I also find that this 
crowding in is consistent with signaling, since the rate of crowding in is larger for younger 
charities.  These are charities about which less information is likely to be known by donors, and 
thus the signal value of a grant ought to be larger.  For the oldest charities, the crowding-in effect 
disappears.  Estimates of the effect of private donations on government grants are not significant.  
 The presence of crowding in of contributions to charities is of concern to both 
governments and individuals who make these contributions.  A government might choose an 
optimal level of provision of a charity or public good and adjust its funding to reach that level.  
Without accounting for the crowding in response by private donors, funding may exceed the 
optimal level.  Likewise, if the level of private donations affects government support, then an 
individual's optimal level of giving ought to account for the reaction of government grants.  
Many worry that large increases in private funding for global public health initiatives, including 
large grants from the Gates Foundation, are causing local governments to reduce health 
spending, evidence of crowding out of government grants.6  For a small individual donor, the 
magnitude of crowd out is negligible, but for a donor or foundation making a large gift this 
consideration may be important. 
 A theoretical model is not presented here but is available in an earlier working paper 
version of this paper (Heutel 2009) or an online appendix.  Here I summarize the main intuitive 
findings of the model that guide the empirical work.  The one-for-one crowding out result from 
Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) assumes that government grants are set exogenously and private 
                                                 
5 Garrett and Rhine (2010) use time series data on aggregate government and private contributions to charities to test 
for Granger causality in both directions.  They find evidence that grants crowd out donations and that donations 
crowd out grants for some types of charities and some types of government funding.   
6 See Cohen (2006) and Smith and MacKellar (2007). 
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donors respond to them.  An alternative assumption is that private donations are exogenous, and 
the government chooses a level of contributions to maximize social welfare in response.  Under 
this assumption a symmetric result is found: private donations crowd out government grants at a 
one-for-one rate.  The model can be extended a number of ways, by including a warm glow 
effect, modeling governments as non-benevolent, including charity response, or considering 
various equilibria in which both private donors and governments move endogenously.  The warm 
glow effect in particular changes the magnitude of crowding out; it will be at a rate less than one-
for-one.  But the main finding is sustained: government grants can respond to private donors in 
the same way that private donors can respond to government grants.  The first empirical question 
is the following: do private donations crowd out government grants? 
 The second empirical question is generated by extending the model to allow for 
information asymmetry.  If the government observes a charity's quality while private donors do 
not, the government can use its funding to signal quality.  If the government signals higher 
quality with higher funding, then a crowding-in effect will emerge: higher government grants 
will cause higher private donations.  Symmetrically, if private donors have the better information 
about charity quality, their donations can act as signals to the government and crowd in grants.  
The magnitude of this crowding in depends on how individuals' beliefs about charity quality are 
influenced by government grants, i.e., the strength of the signal.  The crowding-in effect exists 
alongside the crowding-out effect; it is not clear which effect dominates.  The second empirical 
question is thus the following: is there any evidence of crowding in, either of private donations 
by government grants or in the opposite direction? 
 The finding of crowding in is not definitive evidence of signaling, since crowding in 
could materialize for other reasons.  So, where I do find crowding in, I also investigate if the 
crowding in is consistent with signaling.  The crowding-in effect occurs only when there is 
imperfect information about charity quality.  It is likely that information about charity quality 
varies by charity.  Older charities are more likely to have well-established reputations; younger 
charities are more likely to be unknown by donors.  I therefore expect that the crowding-in effect 
from signaling will be larger for younger charities than for older charities.  Another empirical 
question is the following: where there is crowding in, does its magnitude vary by charity age?   
Charities typically advertise the grants they receive from both governments and private 
grant makers on their websites, in newsletters, and in press releases.  If government grants 
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crowded out private giving, it is unlikely that charities would make public the receipt of such 
grants.  On the other hand, grants signaling quality and crowding in donations are more 
consistent with this observed behavior.   
 
1. DATA 
 The data on nonprofit organizations come from IRS tax returns filed by eligible 
organizations.  These data are collected and distributed by the National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) at the Urban Institute.7  They are based on the Forms 990 or 990EZ that must 
be filed by all 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations except for religious organizations and any 
organization with less than $25,000 in gross receipts.8  These data from 1998-2003 are contained 
in the Guidestar-NCCS National Nonprofit Research Database, which contains 1,388,480 
observations from all public charities that filed within those fiscal years.  The data set does not 
include 501(c)(3) private foundations, which receive most of their money from investments and 
endowments and use it primarily to make grants to organizations rather than directly for 
charitable services; private foundations file IRS Form 990-PF. 
 Organizations are classified according to the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities 
(NTEE), a system developed by the NCCS.  The NTEE divides charities into 645 centile level 
codes, collapsible into 26 major groups and 10 major categories.  In order to make my results 
more comparable with prior research, I limit my scope to a particular set of charities.  Most 
research in crowding out or crowding in of charitable donations has examined social service 
charities, and so I select organizations from the following NTEE categories: crime, employment, 
food and nutrition, housing, human services and community improvement.9    
 The large data set, containing entries from all 501(c)(3) nonprofit charities that filed with 
the IRS between 1998 and 2003, is useful for analysis but also presents problems with messy 
                                                 
7 http://nccs.urban.org.  
8 Religious organizations receive 35 percent of all charitable giving in the United States (Giving USA, 2011).  
Religious organizations that receive the majority of their revenue from serving the general public are required to file 
Forms 990.  These include the Sisters of Mercy hospital chain and Lutheran Social Services.  About 15,000 such 
religious organizations were required to file in 2001.  Examining donations to Presbyterian Church congregations, 
Hungerman (2005) finds that government provision of charitable services crowd out church donations by 20-38 
cents on the dollar.   
9 These are the organizations listed under the 1-digit NTEE codes of I, J, K, L, P and S.  This is the same set of 
codes used by Andreoni and Payne (2003) for their set of social service organizations.  Andreoni and Payne (2003) 
also exclude some organizations that they describe as not directly providing services, while I include all 501(c)(3) 
organizations in those categories (see their fn 15).   
 7 
data.  Still, I undertake measures to clean the data.  The data set contains 339,716 observations 
on 76,725 charities.  I drop observations for which there is clear evidence of reporting error.  
Some charities report revenues by category (e.g. private donations, government grants) that do 
not add up to the reported level of total revenues.  Likewise, for some charities the expenditures 
do not add up correctly.  I purge all of these observations from the data set, leaving 321,094 
observations (95 percent) and 75,226 charities (98 percent).  Though the data are a panel, it is a 
very unbalanced one.  To compensate, I include in the base case regressions only those charities 
that appear for all six years, leaving 175,242 observations (55 percent of the previous total) and 
29,207 charities (39 percent).  Below, I consider how limiting the data set to a balanced panel 
affects both the summary statistics and the regression results.  Finally, I eliminate charities that 
ever report a negative value for private donations, government grants, or program service 
revenue, eliminating an additional 69 charities (only 0.2 percent).  Regressions are performed on 
this cleaned data sample as well as on a number of subsamples that eliminate certain types of 
charities or observations, as described below.  In general, the results that I obtain in the base case 
are comparable across these different sample specifications.  This is especially important to note 
for this application, since previous authors have found that when working with data from Form 
990s the choice of sample matters greatly for the results. 
 Previous authors have found discrepancies or errors in similar data sets, especially in the 
identifier variables for the charity's type (NTEE code) and state.  Among the charities in the 
balanced panel, none change their NTEE code over the six year period.  Some charities (1,206, 
or 4.1 percent) do change states.  This could be due to data error, which is problematic since 
many of my control variables and instruments are at the state-year level.  Or, it could result in the 
charity actually relocating, in which case I want to take advantage of that variation.  I identify the 
charities that are erroneously coded as changing states in the following way.  Of the charities that 
are reported to change states, 830 of them (68.8 percent) have the same state listed for five out of 
the six years, and the year in which the state is listed differently is not the first or last year of the 
sample.  As it is unlikely that a charity would relocate one year and then relocate back the 
following year, I interpret these observations as errors and replace the state variable with the 
state from the charity's other five observations.  The remaining 376 charities either moved in the 
first or last years of the sample period or had more than one year in a different location, and I do 
not change the state variables for them.  An inspection of the scans of the original 990 forms for 
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several of these charities supports this distinction between those that actually moved and those 
that were inaccurately reported.10  
 Table 1 presents revenues aggregated into four main categories and compares summary 
statistics from the full, uncleaned data set to those from the smaller sample used in the analysis.  
Private donations include direct and indirect public support.11  Government grants and program 
service revenue have their own categories,12 and the remaining revenues are classified as "other."  
I also present statistics on charities' reported fundraising expenditures.  Table 1 shows that the 
mean values are all much higher than the median values, and even the 75th percentile values, 
suggesting a data set that is skewed towards high-revenue organizations.  The differences 
between corresponding statistics in the full data set and the cleaned sample are small; the mean 
values of all variables are smaller and the median and 75th percentiles are larger in the limited 
data compared to the full set.  The limited data are slightly less skewed than the full data, and 
hence performing econometric analyses on this limited sample may overemphasize the effect 
from larger charities.   
 
2. ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY 
 Fundamentally, two different empirical questions are investigated.  First, do government 
grants affect private donations to charities?  Second, do private donations affect government 
grants?  While numerous papers have tested for causality in the first direction, no paper has 
examined causality in the opposite direction using panel data on a large number of charities.  
Because of these two questions, I run two separate regressions, one in which the level of private 
donations to a charity is the dependent variable and the level of government grants is an 
independent variable, and one with those two variables reversed.  Initially I merely identify 
whether crowding out or crowding in occurs in either direction, and I do not attempt to account 
for its source.  Following these initial regressions, I will test whether any crowding in that I find 
is explained by signaling.  I show that crowding in is stronger among those charities for which 
less information is known by donors, i.e. younger charities. 
                                                 
10 Simply dropping all charities that report moving states from the regression analysis results in coefficients of 
approximately the same value as in the base case. 
11 Indirect public support is comprised mainly of donations given to the charities collected by federated fundraising 
agencies, such as the United Way. 
12 Program service revenue is the money collected from the services that form the organizations' exemption from 
tax.  For example, a hospital would count as program service revenue all of its charges from medical services.     
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 The estimating equations take the following form: 
yit = βxit + BXit  + αi + γt + eit 
The dependent variable  yit  is either the level of government grants or the level of private 
donations for charity  i  in year  t,  depending on which regression is run.  The right-hand-side 
variable of interest,  xit,  is the opposite value (i.e.  xit  is government grants when  yit  is private 
donations, and vice versa).  The net crowding-out or crowding-in effect is  β.  A vector of 
controls  Xit  is included for each observation.  I exploit the panel nature of the data by including 
an organization-fixed effect and a year-fixed effect,  αi  and   γt,  respectively.13  The error is  eit. 
 The estimate of  β  will clearly be biased since both private donations and government 
grants are determined endogenously.  A common shock, for instance an increase in demand for a 
charity's services, may affect both donations and grants simultaneously in the same direction, 
biasing upwards  β.  Alternatively, endogeneity could bias the estimate downwards.  A 
restructuring of the charity could cause it to reallocate its funding between donations and grants, 
which would create a negative correlation between these two values not due to crowding out.   
To overcome this bias and identify  β,  I utilize instrumental variables.  (Regressions in both 
directions without using instrumental variables are presented in the online appendix.) 
 Two separate sets of instrumental variables are required: one for each direction of 
causality.  First, in the regression where private donations are the dependent variable and 
government grants are the endogenous regressor, appropriate instruments must be relevant 
(affecting the level of government grants) and excludable (not directly affecting the level of 
private donations).  Furthermore, because I am effectively estimating simultaneous equations, the 
instrument for government grants should also not belong as an instrument in the first stage of the 
private donations equation.  For this set of instruments, I use state-year-level measures of 
government transfers to individuals from Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.14  This 
represents the overall level of transfers and government giving in a state a particular year.  Some 
states may be more "generous" in their giving, and these instruments ought to proxy that.15  The 
                                                 
13 The Hausman specification test rejects the assumption that the unobservable effect is uncorrelated with the other 
regressors, so a fixed-effects model is employed rather than a random-effects model. 
14 Khanna and Sandler (2000), Andreoni and Payne (2003), and Payne (1998) use similar instruments.  Data are 
available from the U.S. Social Security Administration website. 
15 Though the basic level of SSI benefits is set at the federal level, many states choose to supplement that value.  For 
instance, California's state supplement can raise the $674 federal benefit rate for a single person to $1086, depending 
on circumstances (http://ssa.gov/pubs/11125.html), whereas six states pay no supplement 
(http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-benefits-ussi.htm).  In addition to the benefit rate, eligibility criteria for the disability 
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generosity of government is determined in a political process, and thus it may be directly 
correlated with private donations and fail the exogeneity requirement: more generous donors 
elect more generous governments.  This is controlled for by the inclusion in the set of controls  
Xit  of the political and economic variables described below.  The maintained assumption is that 
whatever variance in a state's SSI transfers not accounted for by political or economic variables 
ought to capture something about the government itself rather than about the underlying 
electorate, and thus these instruments ought to satisfy the exogeneity assumption. 
Second, instrumental variables for private donations ought to affect private donations but 
not government grants directly.  I use one instrument for private donations, available at the 
charity-year level: membership dues.  Funding from individuals can come from two sources, 
listed separately on the Form 990: direct public support (donations) and dues.  Though it may 
appear that membership dues are just an alternative way to classify private contributions, there 
are well-defined differences between the two funding sources, as delineated in the Form 990 
instructions.  Charities are instructed to report as dues only those payments that "compare 
reasonably" with available membership benefits.  Examples of benefits listed in the instructions 
include subscriptions to publications or newsletters and reduced-rate admissions to events.  If 
membership dues exceed the value of such benefits, then charities are instructed to report the 
difference in value as donations, not dues.16  Dues are thus what members pay for the private 
goods consisting of membership benefits, not the public good that is the charity's primary 
purpose.  The amount of dues that a charity receives is likely to be correlated with the amount of 
private donations received, since charities with higher membership bases may get more of both 
types of revenues.  However, given that charities provide public goods only using monies from 
                                                                                                                                                             
payments may vary by state, since each state independently determines disability status 
(http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/general-info.htm).  I also used the level of OASDI benefits as 
instruments, but adding those had no effect on the results. 
16 The wording from the 2003 Form 990 Instructions (nearly identical for all sample years) is: "Dues received by an 
organization, to the extent they are more than the monetary value of the membership benefits available to the dues 
payer, are a contribution that should be reported on line 1a [private donations]."  Also: "If a member pays dues 
mainly to support the organization's activities and not to obtain benefits of more than nominal monetary value, those 
dues are a contribution to the organization includable on line 1a."  After the 2007 tax year, the Form 990 was 
substantially redesigned, and membership dues are no longer reported as a separate category.  (Dues are now 
included with program service revenue, not with private donations.) 
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their contributions and not using monies from dues, the level of government grants ought not to 
respond to the level of dues.17 
There are several caveats to this instrument choice.  First, there may be reporting error.  
Though charities are clearly instructed to delineate appropriately between dues and contributions, 
they may neglect to do so.  Second, the instrument may be irrelevant; dues may not correlate 
with donations.  Third, the exogeneity assumption may fail, if governments do in fact respond to 
the level of dues, treating them as contributions to a public good.   
Though the exogeneity assumption cannot directly be tested, the regression results can 
shed some light on the validity of the identification strategy.  On the whole, identification of the 
effect of government grants on private donations is more successful than identification of the 
effect in the other direction.  First-stage results from both regressions are available in the online 
appendix.  The F-statistics for the significance of the instruments in the first stage are all greater 
than ten for the regressions where government grants are the endogenous regressors and SSI 
transfer payments are the instruments, but the F-statistics are less than ten for most of the first-
stage regressions where private donations are the endogenous regressors and dues are the 
instrument.  This suggests that dues may be a weak instrument for private donations, and that 
those regression results ought to be interpreted with caution.  In fact, in the second-stage 
regression estimating the effect of private donations on government grants, the coefficient is not 
consistently found to be significantly different from zero.   
An additional consideration involves the response of the charity itself to grants and 
donations.  In particular, a growing literature examines how a charity's fundraising expenditures 
change in response to government grants (Andreoni and Payne 2003, 2011).  Fundraising is 
therefore included in both sets of regressions.  Furthermore, since fundraising expenditures are 
endogenously determined by the charity, I add instrumental variables for fundraising.  I use two 
different variables at the charity-level as instruments for fundraising expenditures.  First, I use 
the amount of administrative expenditures reported by a charity on the Form 990.18  Since the 
                                                 
17 An alternative instrument for private donations that I investigated is a measure of the price of a dollar of charitable 
donation based on the state's income tax and rules for allowing deductions of those contributions.  This, however, is 
a poor instrument because the donations to a charity in a particular state do not necessarily come from donors within 
that state, because tax rates are heterogeneous within a state, and because tax rates are likely to be directly correlated 
with government budgets and hence grants to charities.   
18 According to the instructions for the Form 990, administrative expenses, or "management and general" expenses, 
are a charity's "expenses for overall organization and management, rather than for its direct conduct of fundraising 
activities or program services." 
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same personnel can be employed to do both administrative and fundraising tasks, the two types 
of expenditures may be correlated.  In years when an organization has a higher level of 
management expenses, it is likely to be able to spend more effort and money on fundraising; the 
first stage regression results support this claim.  Furthermore, the level of private donations that a 
charity receives in a given year ought not to be directly affected by management expenses, since 
management expenses are reported separately from fundraising expenses.19  The administrative 
expenditures instrument may also correct for measurement error, if misclassification of 
fundraising as administrative expenses is organization-specific.  Second, I use the total liabilities 
of the charity reported in the current year.  This instrument measures the financial security of the 
organization, which will help determine its fundraising strategy independent of private or public 
funding. A charity facing a less secure financial status (as measured by higher total liabilities) 
may seek to increase its fundraising expenditures to compensate; this claim is verified in first 
stage regression results.  A charity's financial security could directly affect its level of private 
donations if donors respond to this level of financial security (e.g. a donor does not want to give 
money to a charity that is on the verge of collapse).  However, it is unlikely that donors have 
information on the contemporaneous financial conditions of a charity, at least not to the extent 
that a charity has.  Donors may perceive an overall level of a charity's well-being, but this is 
controlled for with a charity fixed effect. 20  Fundraising is treated as an endogenous regressor in 
all regressions where private donations are the left-hand-side variable; results are comparable 
when fundraising is instead treated as exogenous.  In the regressions where government grants 
are the left-hand-side variable, fundraising is initially treated as exogenous but treated as 
endogenous in later robustness checks.  In those regressions, the choice of whether to treat 
fundraising as exogenous or endogenous does substantively affect the results.  A final concern is 
the potential for measurement error, especially in how nonprofits report their fundraising vs. 
management expenses on their Form 990s.  Thornton and Belski (2010) cite concerns with the 
990 data and show that donors are influenced by proxies for financial reporting quality. 
                                                 
19 Breman (2008) uses the same variable to instrument for fundraising expenses in a data set from Swedish charities.  
However, Thornton and Belski (2010) estimate a significant effect on private donations of a constructed price of 
donations, where the constructed price is based in part on management expenses.  
20 This same argument is made in Andreoni and Payne (2011), who use this variable as an instrument for fundraising 
along with another variable that is unavailable in my dataset: occupancy expenses.  Yetman and Yetman (2003) test 
for the effect of endowment size (highly correlated with total liabilities) on donations and find no effect. 
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Finally, control variables  Xit  are added to all of the regressions.  At the charity level, 
these are the level of program service revenues and all other revenues, as well as the charity's 
age, as measured by the date that the IRS bestowed it nonprofit status.  Furthermore, I gather a 
number of state-year or county-year level variables to control for economic, demographic, and 
political conditions.  These are matched to the charity by the state or county where the charity is 
located.  From the Bureau of Labor Statistics I obtain the county-year level unemployment rate, 
and from the Bureau of Economic Analysis the county-year level per capita income and total 
population.  At the state-year level I include the fraction of the population 65 or older, the 
fraction of a state's US Congress and Senate delegations that are Democrats, and a dummy for 
whether the state governor is a Democrat.  Political and economic variables may have important 
effects on the levels of both private and public contributions to charities.  A state with a higher 
proportion of Democrats in power is likely to be composed of more liberal citizens who may be 
more willing to provide financial support for charities.  Likewise, Democratic congresses may be 
more willing to approve higher levels of funding for these groups.  If so, leaving out political 
proxies causes an upward bias on the coefficient of interest.     
 
3. RESULTS 
 The results for these instrumental variables, fixed effects regressions are presented in 
Tables 2 and 3.  Table 2 presents the results from regressions where private donations are the 
dependent variable and government grants are the endogenous regressor; Table 3 presents the 
results from regressions where these are reversed.  In column 1 are the base case results, using 
the full sample of cleaned data.  The tables report the F-statistic for the significance of the 
instruments in the first-stage of the regression, the Hansen overidentification test J-statistic, and 
the Cragg-Donald F-statistic for weak instruments.  The reported standard errors allow for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using a Newey-West kernel-based estimator of the 
variance matrix. 
 The coefficient of interest in the regressions in Table 2 is that of government grants.  The 
expected sign of this coefficient is ambiguous.  Absent government signaling of charity quality, 
it should be negative, indicating crowding out.  Signaling can cause crowding in, making the 
coefficient positive.  In the first column, the coefficient is positive though not quite statistically 
significant (the p-value is 0.190).  This is evidence for crowding in rather than crowding out, 
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consistent with results found by Khanna and Sandler (2000) and Payne (2001).  Neither program 
service revenue nor other revenues are significantly correlated with donations.  Fundraising 
expenditures increase private donations.  The coefficients on the state- and county-year level 
controls are generally insignificant.   
 Columns 2 through 6 present robustness checks using different specifications or by 
contracting or expanding the data sample.  Column 2 reports results using a Tobit specification to 
account for the left-censoring at zero of the dependent variable.  This Tobit specification, 
however, does not include an organization fixed effect.  The point estimate of the coefficient on 
government grants is about halved compared to the regression in column 1, but it is significant 
since its standard error is much smaller.21 
Columns 3 through 5 explore the robustness of these results to contracting or expanding 
the dataset.  It is possible that crowding out or crowding in is only applicable to a subset of the 
charities, for two reasons.  First, while some of the controls and instruments are at the state-year 
level, not all of the charities operate only in the state where they are registered.  Many are 
national organizations that accept donations and possibly government grants from other states.  
For these charities, these instruments and controls are unlikely to be good predictors.  Though I 
cannot know for certain which organizations are national and which are local, column 3 excludes 
those whose names begin with "National," "American," or "North American."  Column 3 also 
excludes organizations classified as support organizations under the NTEE taxonomy.22  These 
organizations do not directly provide services but support organizations or individuals who do 
provide services through management and technical assistance, fundraising, and public policy 
analysis.  Second, many of the charities receive no government grants throughout the entire six-
year sample period, and many receive no private donations throughout the period.  Such charities 
are likely to receive no funding at all from one of these two sources, even in response to a change 
in the other funding source, and thus I also exclude them from the regressions in column 3. 
Limiting the sample in this way increases the magnitude of the coefficient, and it becomes 
significant at the 5 percent level.   
Column 4 presents regression results when the data set is limited using a different 
criterion.  Outliers are always problematic, and perhaps they are especially problematic for these 
                                                 
21 Compared to an IV regression without fixed effects and without accounting for censorship, this coefficient is 
about three times smaller (coefficients are significant in both regressions). 
22 These are organizations whose last two digits of the NTEE centile code are less than 20. 
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data.  I have already eliminated charities and observations for which there is clear evidence of 
accounting or reporting error, for example those whose summed categorical revenues do not add 
up to the reported total revenues.  Even absent these obvious irregularities, though, one may 
worry about charities reporting unusually high levels of donations or grants.  In column 4, I 
eliminate the influence of the largest charities by dropping from the sample those observations 
whose private donations are in the top 5 percent of the total distribution and those observations 
whose government grants are in the top 5 percent.  This refinement does not substantially change 
the regression results compared to column 1.  Finally, under data cleaning a large fraction of 
organizations was removed for not being in the panel for all six years.  Column 5 thus replicates 
the regression results without removing charities based on the number of years in which they 
appear in the dataset.  The coefficient of interest, on government grants, is somewhat larger than 
in column 1 but is not significant, since the standard error is larger (despite the larger sample 
size).       
Overall, Table 2 suggests that a dollar increase in government grants to a charity 
increases the charity's private donations by about 10 to 30 cents.23  Though generally not quite 
significant at the 10 percent level, the results are comparable across different specifications of 
the data sample.  I do not claim that one specification is preferred over any other, but rather I 
want to investigate whether crowding in varies for different specifications of the sample.  Prior 
studies of crowding out or crowding in typically present results for only a small subset of the raw 
data available.  For instance, in Andreoni and Payne (2003), of the original sample of social 
service charities, fully 92 percent are dropped from the analysis for one reason or another.  In my 
results, the most significant coefficients arise from the regressions where the sample is limited 
(columns 3 and 4), suggesting that the sample selection employed by Andreoni and Payne (2003) 
and other papers may be affecting the significance of their results, if not the magnitudes.   
Table 2 presents the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first-
stage regression; they are strongly significant in all columns except the second.  Table 2 also 
presents the Hansen J test statistic from a test of overidentifying restrictions, possible because the 
number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous regressors.  The null hypothesis of 
this test is that the instruments are valid, so a rejection calls into question the validity of the 
instruments.  The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in any columns.  Finally, Table 2 presents 
                                                 
23 In each column I can reject the hypotheses that the coefficient is 1, which would indicate 100 percent crowding in. 
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the value of the Cragg-Donald F-statistic from Stock and Yogo (2005), a test for weak 
instruments.  It should be noted that, though the F-statistics on the instruments from the first 
stage regression are high, the Cragg-Donald F-statistics are quite low compared to their critical 
values.  
 Table 3 presents the regressions in the opposite direction, where the level of government 
grants is the dependent variable and the level of private donations is the endogenous regressor.  
Columns 1 through 5 mimic the respective columns in Table 2.  Column 1 is the base case, 
column 2 uses IV Tobit, columns 3 and 4 limit the sample as described above, and column 5 
includes the unbalanced panel.  In addition, Table 3 includes a sixth column, in which 
fundraising expenditures are treated as endogenous and instrumented for with the same measures 
used in Table 2.  The coefficient of interest is on private donations and is negative in four out of 
the six columns, but only significantly so in one column.  The magnitudes of the point estimates 
are large, suggesting that private donations crowd out government grants by 30 percent to 170 
percent.  But this evidence is weak, because of both the lack of a significant coefficient and the 
weak instrument issues described earlier.  Furthermore, the regression results from column 4, 
which eliminate the top 5 percent of charities measured by government grants or private 
donations, give a positive coefficient that is significant at the 5 percent level.  The coefficient in 
column 6, in which fundraising is treated as endogenous, is significantly positive and large.  The 
results in this direction are thus both mixed and weak.  Other regressors are more significant.  
Program service revenue is negatively correlated with government grants, as is the county 
unemployment rate.  The large Cragg-Donald statistics indicate that, though the instruments are 
somewhat weak, the 2SLS results are not misleading.24 
 In addition to being comparable across these alternative sample specifications, the results 
for the regressions where private donations are the dependent variable are comparable when 
estimated by LIML rather than 2SLS, though these regression results are not reported.  These 
results are also unaffected by estimating the equations simultaneously using 3SLS. 25 
 
3.1 Crowding in by Charity Age 
                                                 
24 Because of the high standard errors, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on grants is –1, indicating 
100 percent crowding out, in columns 1, 3, 4, and 5. 
25 Monte Carlo studies comparing system estimators to equation-by-equation estimators have found that the 
efficiency advantages of the former are modest in finite samples (see Greene 2003, p. 451).  Replication of the 
regressions in Table 3 using either LIML or 3SLS yields mixed results, as do the results presented in Table 3. 
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 The analysis finds evidence that government grants crowd in private donations for these 
charities.  But is this due to signaling?  The signaling explanation depends upon uncertainty 
among donors as to the charity quality.  Thus a measure of uncertainty about charity quality will 
be beneficial in testing the signaling theory: charities about which individuals know less should 
experience larger crowding in effects than charities that are well known.  How can the 
uncertainty about a charity be measured?   
I use the age of the charity.  Older charities are likely to be better known by donors.  If 
so, the signaling effect for older charities should be smaller than for younger charities.  By 
interacting a charity's age with the value of government grants, I can determine if the crowding 
in from government grants depends on age.26  The results for this exercise are presented in Table 
4, which reports results from regressions where private donations are the dependent variable, 
government grants and fundraising expenditures are endogenous regressors, and the same 
instruments and controls are used as in Table 2 (though not reported).  Column 1 includes the 
cleaned data sample used in column 1 of Table 2, and it also includes an interaction term 
between age and grants.  Column 2 present IV Tobit regression results with the age-grant 
interaction, and column 3 limits the sample in the same way as does column 3 in Tables 2 and 
3.27  Columns 4 through 6 consider different specifications of the age-grant interaction.  Column 
4 includes a quadratic term in age, column 5 includes indicators for the four quartiles of the age 
distribution and their interactions with grants (the first quartile is the omitted dummy), and 
column 6 includes the natural log of age and its interaction rather than the level.   
In all columns of Table 4 save the last, the coefficient on grants is significantly positive 
and the coefficient on the interaction term is significantly negative.  The coefficient on 
government grants does not represent the marginal effect of grants since it does not include the 
interaction.  At the bottom of Table 4, I report the marginal effect of grants evaluated at the 
median charity age, as well as the marginal effect of age evaluated both at the 10th percentile  and 
90th percentile of grants.  For the Tobit specification, these are the marginal effects of the 
unobserved, censored variable.  The marginal effect of age is positive but not significant in most 
columns.  It is significant in column 4, which includes the quadratic in age.  This suggests 
                                                 
26 An alternative measure of charity uncertainty might be generated using publicly available ratings of charities from 
organizations such as Charity Navigator.  However, these ratings only cover a very small fraction of charities and 
have not been around long enough to cover all years in the data set. 
27 Unreported regressions also limit and expand the sample in the same way as did columns 4 through 6 of Tables 2 
and 3; results are comparable. 
 18 
diminishing marginal returns to age.  The marginal effect of grants at the tenth percentile of age 
is significantly positive in all columns but the last, and it varies between about 0.22 to 1.90, 
higher than the marginal effects in Table 2 when the interaction term is not included.  At the 90th 
percentile of age, the marginal effect of grants is either negative or indistinguishable from zero.   
The negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the crowding in effect decreases by 
about 1 to 2 cents on the dollar per year the charity has been around.  In the first three columns, 
the ratio of the coefficient on government grants and the coefficient on the interaction term 
indicates that grants crowd in private donations for charities younger than 40 years old and 
crowd out donations for charities older than 40.  In column 4, which includes the quadratic, the 
year at which grants start crowding out is about 25 years.  Column 5 shows that, relative to the 
youngest age quartile (up to age nine years), the crowding in from grants is lower in all other 
quartiles.  The marginal effect of grants on donations is not significantly different from zero for 
age quartiles three and four, and is only significantly positive at the 10 percent level for age 
quartile two.  These results support the theory that older charities receive less of a signal from 
receipt of grants, and so the value of crowding in is less.28  The exception is column 6, where age 
enters in a log form.  Here, no significant effects from age or grants arise.29 
 
3.2 Lagged Grants 
 The econometrics are static.  Since charities exist for many years, the effects from 
crowding out or from signaling are likely to last for more than just a single year.  It thus seems 
appropriate to consider dynamic extensions of the empirical results.  One would expect that the 
signaling effect is likely to be cumulative over time: a grant signaling high quality in period t 
will positively influence donations not just in period t but also in periods t+1, t+2, etc.  This is 
because the quality of a public good is persistent over time.  Likewise the stock of grants 
received up to a point of time is a measure of the degree of quality certification.  A grant in a 
                                                 
28 Crowding in should also be expected if government funding comes in the form of matching grants.  
Unfortunately, no information about matching is available in the data.  Some of the crowding in phenomenon may 
be explained by matching grants, though matching grants do not explain why crowding in is less for older charities 
(unless they receive a lower fraction of their government grants in the form of matching grants).  Matching, in the 
context of intergovernmental grants, is studied in Baicker and Staigler (2005) and Klor (2006). 
29 Compare these findings to those in Payne (2001), which also tests for a signaling value of government grants, but 
to universities.  That paper finds that government grants crowd in private donations for research universities, but 
they crowd out private donations for non-research universities.  If research universities have greater pre-existing 
reputations than non-research universities, then those results are not consistent with the strength of the signal being 
inversely related to donors' knowledge of the organization. 
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particular year is a noisy signal, but the cumulative sum of grants has less noise and indicates 
sustained quality of an organization.  Consider instead not the signaling effect but the classic 
crowding-out effect.  Whether or not this effect is cumulative or merely contemporaneous 
depends upon whether the public good is durable or transient in impact.  If transient, then the 
crowding out from government grants in period t will negatively affect private donations only in 
period t.  If the public good is durable, then the government grants in period t will crowd out 
donations in future periods as well.  In addition, without intertemporal separability of utility there 
are potentially more dynamic effects.  Thus, the effects of government grants on private 
donations may be long lasting.   
 This is tested empirically in Table 5 by regressing private donations (in year  t) on either 
current government grants (from year  t),  lagged grants, or cumulative government grants (the 
sum of grants to a charity in all years up to  t – 1).  Each regression in Table 5 includes all of the 
same controls and instruments as in Table 2, though they are not reported.  Column 1 reports 
results from a regression that includes the one-year lag of government grants as the endogenous 
regressor (where the instruments are also lagged by one year); the coefficient is not significant.  
In column 2, both current and one-year lagged grants are included.  The current level of grants 
has a positive coefficient, and the one-year lag has a negative coefficient.  This may represent a 
mean reversion among charities' timing in responses to grants.  Another complication is that 
grants may be multi-year but reported entirely in the year that the grant was approved.  Column 3 
includes a one- and two-year lag of grants.  Both are negative and insignificant, and the 
coefficient on current grants is positive and only significant at the 13 percent level.  Lastly, 
column 4 includes current and cumulative government grants.  The coefficient on current grants 
is positive and significant, while the coefficient on cumulative grants is negative with a very 
small magnitude and low level of significance.  On the whole, these results suggest that the 
crowding in effect is largely contemporaneous, with the possible exception of a one-year lag 
effect.   
An alternative way to look dynamically at the data, to see if current values of donations, 
say, are affected by lagged values of government grants, is through a vector autoregression 
(VAR).  However, testing for Granger causality in either direction using panel data VAR 
methods developed in Holtz-Eakin et. al. (1988) fails to find causality from lagged values of 
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government grants or private donations. 30  The data used are annual, limiting how much the 
effect of timing can be observed.  If a grant early in one year affects donations later in the same 
fiscal year, then that dynamic response cannot be measured with annual data. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 The prediction of crowding out of private donations by government grants, proposed in 
Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984), has had numerous empirical investigations.  Many studies, 
including Kingma (1989) and Payne (1998), find evidence of partial crowding out.  Other papers, 
including Khanna and Sandler (2000) and Payne (2001), find evidence of crowding in.  Though 
their results differ, most of these papers have in common that they use a relatively small sample 
of charities, and they test for crowding out or crowding in only in one direction. 
 Here I extend that literature by looking at a large data set of social service charities that 
file Form 990 with the IRS, which includes non-religious charities with at least $25,000 in gross 
receipts.  The first main contribution is the empirical examination of crowding out in the 
opposite direction: private donations crowding out government grants.  The second main 
contribution is to test if contributions can act as signals for charity quality, leading to crowding 
in.  I find evidence that government grants crowd in private donations, and this crowding in 
appears to be due to signaling, since crowding in is larger for younger charities about which 
donors know less.  The evidence for crowding out or crowding in in the opposite direction is 
weak. 
 One empirical extension to this paper is to test for signaling from private donations by 
taking advantage of a distinction between two types of private donations: those from individuals 
and those from private foundations.  Foundations (or trusts, corporations, or estates) are likely to 
devote resources to researching charities and thus may have more information about charity 
quality.  Their grants may thus act as a quality signal.  In fact, charities typically advertise receipt 
of grants from both governments and private organizations, indicating that they expect these 
announcements to crowd in donations.  Unfortunately, the data from the IRS Form 990s do not 
allow this level of disaggregating.  Contributions from individuals, as well as trusts, 
corporations, estates, and foundations, are all listed under the same category of "direct public 
                                                 
30 Garrett and Rhine (2010) perform VARs on time series data of aggregate annual private donations and 
government grants to charities. 
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support."  If another data source disaggregated private donations into contributions from 
individuals and contributions from private foundations, then this extension may give empirical 
support to private donations acting as signals.  
 The signaling explanation assumes that governments have better information about 
charity quality than private donors have.  It is unfortunately difficult if not impossible to directly 
assess this claim.  One piece of evidence is the average size of gifts; larger donors are likely to 
spend more effort gathering information on charity quality than are small individual donors.  
Data on average gift size are unavailable, but of private donations, 73 percent are from 
individuals, while only 14 percent are from foundations.31  Individuals are likely to be less 
informed than are foundations or governments.  Applications for government grants to nonprofits 
are lengthy, just like government research grant applications.32  The information that grant-
making agencies receive in these applications likely makes them more informed about a charity's 
quality than the average individual donor.  It is possible that for political reasons government 
spending on a charity may be unrelated to its quality.  For the signaling explanation to be valid, it 
is not strictly necessary that governments have private information on quality; all that is needed 
is for private donors to believe that governments do and to change their voluntary level of giving 
in response. 
 What are the policy implications of these findings?  Governments fund public goods, 
including but not limited to those provided by charities, and hopefully governments would do so 
to increase social welfare by overcoming the free rider problem inherent in public goods.  The 
large prior literature on crowding out suggests that governments ought to acknowledge the effect 
that their giving has on private giving and set their level of grants appropriately.  The signaling 
model and empirical results presented here buttress that suggestion and add that the government's 
grants can influence individuals' donations not only through their effect on the level of the public 
good provision but also through their effect on individuals' information about the quality of the 
public good.  Governments should "worry" about the negative effect that their grants can have 
due to crowding out; they should also "worry" about how the signal value of their grants can 
have positive effects on giving.  The paper's results are also relevant to private donors, especially 
                                                 
31 Giving USA (2010).  The remaining private donations are from bequests (8 percent) and corporations (5 percent).   
32 Nonprofits apply for federal grants through grants.gov, the same service that researchers apply for grants.   
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large donors like foundations who may influence government grants or other private donations 
through the crowding in or crowding out effects of their contributions.  
 A number of additional questions clarifying these effects and the appropriate policy 
responses for governments and private donors may be answered in further research.  I have 
identified that government grants crowd in private donations for the charities in this data set, and 
I have supplied some evidence that this crowding in arises from the signaling value of the 
government grants.  Further research could verify that signaling is the true cause of crowding in 
or examine other potential reasons for crowding in, for example economies of scale in a charity's 
provision of public goods.  This may be answered using similar data on actual contributions or in 
a controlled laboratory setting.  Further research could also address the question of the disparity 
in results between the many papers that find crowding out of private donations and the many, 
including this one, that find crowding in.  An extension using data from other charities besides 
social service charities would be useful.  Finally, development of a thorough theoretical model to 
capture the many effects that could cause crowding in or crowding out in either direction, that 
may include charity fundraising, multiple public goods or charities,33 and dynamics, would be a 
helpful addition to the literature. 
  
                                                 
33 Models that consider multiple public goods include Bergstrom et. al. (1986), Mutuswami and Winter (2004), and 
Ghosh et. al. (2007).  Empirically, Parker and Thurman (2011) find both crowding out and crowding in for two 
different government programs preserving open space, and Albers et. al. (2008) examine public provision of land 
reserves and find crowding in in California and crowding out in Illinois and Massachusetts. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics – Charity Revenues and Fundraising 
 Number of 
Observations 
Number of 
Organizations 
Mean 
($1,000s) 
Standard 
deviation 
($1,000s) 
Median 
($1,000s) 
75th 
percentile 
($1,000s) 
Full Sample       
 339,716 76,725     
Private Donations   334 4790 44 165 
Government Grants   521 3476 0 156 
Program Service 
Revenue 
  972 9413 61 396 
Other Revenue   111 1345 8 43 
Fundraising 
Expenditures 
  25 510 0 2 
Cleaned Sample       
 174,828 29,138     
Private Donations   267 799 41 206 
Government Grants   431 1296 0 241 
Program Service 
Revenue 
  755 1833 117 562 
Other Revenue   89 384 12 56 
Fundraising 
Expenditures 
  21 103 0 4 
Notes: Data are averaged over 1998-2003 in constant 2002 dollars.  Private donations include direct and indirect 
public support.  Other revenue includes interest, rents and sales.   
  
 Table 2 
The Determinants of Private Donationsa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Government Grants 0.145 0.0740*** 0.253** 0.168 0.198 
 (0.110) (0.0184) (0.100) (0.163) (0.268) 
Fundraising Expenditures 8.550 15.64*** -0.922 8.986 10.52 
 (6.340) (0.731) (6.673) (5.923) (10.24) 
Program Service Revenue -0.00307 -0.0210*** 0.0924* -0.0116 0.00463 
 (0.0389) (0.00263) (0.0507) (0.0187) (0.0817) 
Other Revenues -0.0161 -0.265*** -0.0218 -0.0370 -0.00969 
 (0.0170) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0285) (0.0114) 
Age 14,558 1,170*** 28,288 -4,833 -487.3 
 (17,584) (372.0) (34,838) (5,941) (1,021) 
Population  0.00284 -0.0215*** 0.00875 -0.00126 -0.000304 
 (0.00445) (0.00256) (0.00794) (0.00165) (0.00152) 
Income (2003$ per capita) 0.294 -2.803*** -0.651 0.417 1.613 
 (0.960) (0.586) (1.621) (0.300) (2.631) 
Unemployment Rate -7,175 -9,856*** 2,579 -2,554 1,614 
 (5,603) (2,399) (8,286) (2,260) (3,814) 
Percent Population > 65 1.006e+06 -393,949* -2.586e+06 753,512 662,376 
 (2.202e+06) (214,563) (3.376e+06) (791,934) (1.627e+06) 
Number Dem Senators -3,423 -16,781*** -6,853 3,333 -4,209 
 (4,848) (5,247) (6,107) (2,217) (5,407) 
Percent Congress members Dem 15,220 -36,763* 8,476 6,195 21,206 
 (24,544) (21,289) (33,817) (10,868) (26,541) 
Indicator for Democratic governor -7,119 458.1 -17,206*** -2,092 -9,457 
 (5,685) (8,443) (6,511) (2,268) (6,174) 
Observations 161,838 161,838 79,440 146,094 236,373 
Number of Organizations 26,973 26,973 13,245 25,137 46,797 
      
F-statistic on instruments for government grants 
in first-stage regressionb 
22.68 4.37 16.47 19.82 52.45 
(p-value)  (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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F-statistic on instruments for fundraising 
expenditures in first-stage regressionc 
7.71 897.73 5.60 2.19 21.57 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0669) (0.000) 
Hansen J-statistic 0.490 – 1.041 0.380 2.633 
(p-value) (0.783) – (0.594) (0.827) (0.268) 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 1.750 – 1.524 0.804 0.602 
Tobit? No Yes No No No 
Exclude Select Charities? No No Yes Yes No 
Balanced Panel? Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
a The dependent variable in each column is private donations.  Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years 
(except column 6), whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount in a 
revenue category.  Charity-fixed-effects and year indicator variables are included in each regression.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors are in parentheses.  Column 1 results are from the cleaned sample.  The regression results in column 2 are from an IV Tobit regression without 
organization fixed effects.  Column 3 excludes charities that include "National" or "American" in their names, are classified as support organizations, or never 
have nonzero values for government grants or private donations.  Column 4 excludes observations where the level of government grants or the level of private 
donations is in the top 5 percent among all observations.  Column 5 includes the full, unbalanced panel, including organizations that are not in the panel the full 
six years. 
b Instruments for government grants are the state-year total payments paid to individuals through SSI and the state-year payments paid to individuals through SSI 
for the aged.   
c Instruments for fundraising expenditures are the charity's management expenditures and its total liabilities. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 
The Determinants of Government Grantsa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Private Donations -0.533 -0.461*** -1.350 0.632** -0.272 1.965*** 
 (0.973) (0.131) (1.875) (0.265) (0.784) (0.633) 
Fundraising Expenditures 1.293 2.750*** 3.070 -0.159 0.891 32.49*** 
 (1.490) (0.478) (3.160) (0.162) (1.283) (11.15) 
Program Service Revenue -0.269*** -0.151*** -0.476*** -0.0431*** -0.250*** -0.265*** 
 (0.0323) (0.00391) (0.0405) (0.00556) (0.0254) (0.0442) 
Other Revenues -0.0290 0.0369 -0.0434 -0.00380 -0.00394 0.0631 
 (0.0260) (0.0232) (0.0574) (0.00419) (0.0119) (0.0591) 
Age -22,759 20,046*** -71,224 -7,297 229.1 -44,280 
 (26,198) (750.7) (62,247) (6,908) (1,179) (46,852) 
Population  0.00751 -0.0123*** 0.0226 0.000411 0.00192** -0.0145 
 (0.00618) (0.00364) (0.0199) (0.00181) (0.000776) (0.0131) 
Income (2003$ per capita) -1.284 -7.678*** -3.616 -0.432* -3.849* 1.866 
 (0.862) (0.800) (3.112) (0.234) (2.036) (3.116) 
Unemployment Rate -2,370 73,501*** -5,777 -1,138 -8,778*** -29,099*** 
 (2,138) (3,762) (4,409) (765.2) (2,489) (11,060) 
Percent Population > 65 -1.813e+06 337,092 -7.367e+06 -253,502 -711,615 1.424e+07*** 
 (1.727e+06) (346,811) (5.279e+06) (272,737) (775,185) (4.021e+06) 
Number Dem Senators 3,731 122,927*** -6,131 -2,377 4,300 -6,577 
 (4,463) (8,571) (16,365) (1,540) (3,351) (15,948) 
Percent Congress members 
Dem 
45,541 -314,452*** 184,283* 10,200 29,601 4,879 
 (29,404) (33,345) (96,024) (8,066) (22,191) (93,421) 
Indicator for Dem governor 11,113* 15,030 15,017 3,754** 13,820** 15,786 
 (6,382) (13,492) (21,509) (1,888) (5,389) (21,122) 
Observations 161,838 161,838 79,440 146,094 236,373 161,838 
Number of Organizations 26,973 26,973 13,245 25,137 46,797 26,973 
       
F-statistic on instruments for 
private donations in first-
stage regressionb 
7.00 644.58 3.43 16.71 8.84 13.24 
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(p-value) (0.008) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
F-statistic on instruments for 
fundraising expenditures in 
first-stage regressionc 
     8.64 
(p-value)      (0.000) 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 78.63 – 48.44 50.99 91.16 27.58 
Tobit? No Yes No No No No 
Exclude Select Charities? No No Yes Yes No No 
Balanced Panel? Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Fundraising Endogenous? No No No No No Yes 
a The dependent variable in each column is government grants.  Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six 
years (except column 6), whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount 
in a revenue category.  Charity-fixed-effects and year indicator variables are included in each regression.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors are in parentheses.  Column 1 results are from the cleaned sample.  The regression results in column 2 are from an IV Tobit regression without 
organization fixed effects.  Column 3 excludes charities that include "National" or "American" in their names, are classified as support organizations, or never 
have nonzero values for government grants or private donations.  Column 4 excludes observations where the level of government grants or the level of private 
donations is in the top 5 percent among all observations.  Column 5 includes the full, unbalanced panel, including organizations that are not in the panel the full 
six years.  Column 6 allows fundraising to enter the regression as an endogenous right-hand-side variable. 
b The instrument for private donations is the charity's reported level of dues revenue.   
c Instruments for fundraising expenditures are the charity's management expenditures and its total liabilities. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 
The Effect of Age on Crowding Ina 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Government Grants 0.959*** 0.293*** 0.825** 2.617** 0.877*** -2.754 
 (0.366) (0.0529) (0.345) (1.135) (0.320) (2.369) 
Charity Age 8,461 4,617*** 10,137 34,662**   
 (9,471) (775.5) (13,055) (13,840)   
Age*Grants -0.0254*** -0.0089*** -0.0207*** -0.154**   
 (0.00877) (0.00139) (0.00735) (0.0623)   
Age Squared    -125.2   
    (209.0)   
Age Squared*Grants    0.00185**   
    (0.000755)   
Age Quartile 2     159,065***  
     (31,838)  
Age Quartile 3     225,617***  
     (51,810)  
Age Quartile 4     251,869***  
     (56,645)  
Age Quartile 2*Grants     -0.657***  
     (0.198)  
Age Quartile 3*Grants     -0.819***  
     (0.235)  
Age Quartile 4*Grants     -0.857***  
     (0.257)  
Ln(Age)      20,798 
      (111,300) 
Ln(Age)*Grants      0.739 
      (0.721) 
       
Observations 159,912 161,838 78,621 159,912 159,912 159,383 
Number of 
Organizations 
26,652 26,652 13,108 26,652 26,652 26,652 
Marginal Effect of 
Age (at median grant 
level)b 
8461 4617*** 
 
6596 30657 66552*** 1300 
 (9493) (775) (11809) (18758) (22685) (16896) 
Marginal Effect of 
Grants (at 10th 
percentile age)c 
0.832** 0.249*** 0.722** 1.895** 0.220* –1.56 
 (0.319) (0.046) (0.301) (0.821) (0.126) (5.49) 
Marginal Effect of 
Grants (at 90th 
percentile age)d 
–0.006 –0.045*** 0.016 –0.548*** 0.021 –0.066 
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 (0.069) (0.0038) (0.086) (0.151) (0.069) (0.693) 
Tobit? No Yes No No No No 
Exclude Select 
Charities?b 
No No Yes No No No 
a The dependent variable in each column is private donations.  Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those 
organizations that are in the panel for all six years, whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total 
revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount in a revenue category.  Only those 
charities with a consistent value for age are included.  Instruments and control variables from Table 2 all appear in 
these regressions, though not reported.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in 
parentheses.   Column 1 results are from the cleaned sample.  The regression results in column 2 are from an IV 
Tobit regression without organization fixed effects.  Column 3 excludes charities that include "National" or 
"American" in their names, are classified as support organizations, or never have nonzero values for government 
grants or private donations.  Columns 4–6 include the same set of charities as column 1, but column 4 includes a 
quadratic term in age, column 5 includes four categorical indicator variables for age quartile, and column 6 increases 
the natural log of age rather than the level. 
b In column 5, this value is the effect of moving from the second to the third age quartile at the median grant level. 
c In column 5, this value is the marginal effect of grants for charities in the second age quartile. 
d In column 5, this value is the marginal effect of grants for charities in the fourth age quartile.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 
Lagged Grantsa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government Grants  0.432** 0.276 0.237*** 
  (0.177) (0.182) (0.0453) 
Lagged Government Grants -0.0932 -0.630** -0.0934  
 (0.185) (0.280) (0.297)  
Two-Year Lagged Government Grants   -0.347  
   (0.259)  
Cumulative Government Grants    -0.00374* 
    (0.00227) 
Observations 134,865 134,865 107,892 134,865 
Number of Organizations 26,973 26,973 26,973 26,973 
a The dependent variable in each column is private donations.  Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six 
years, whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount in a revenue 
category.  Instruments and control variables from Table 2 all appear in these regressions, though not reported.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors are in parentheses.  Cumulative government grants in time t is the sum of grants to that charity in all periods 1 through  t – 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
